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Abstract
Shortly after Christmas in 1942, the U.S. minister to Australia, Nelson Trusler Johnson, decided the time was
right for a break from his wartime duties. Johnson and his wife, Jane, agreed that a seaside vacation with their
young children was in order. The Johnson family duly motored to Narooma, about 150 miles southeast of
Canberra, for what they expected to be a three-week holiday during the peak of the Australian summer. They
chose the spot for its beauty—and because the children would be able to swim without worrying about
sharks.The Johnsons’ holiday was cut short on January 8, when wire copy began circulating in Australia with
unexpected and unwelcome news. Johnson was to be replaced as minister by a political confidant of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt—Democratic National Committee Chairman Edward J. Flynn of New York. Not only
would Flynn succeed Johnson in Canberra, he would be given an upgraded title—Ambassador
Plenipotentiary—and expanded duties as a “roving Ambassador” in the South Pacific. He would also get
nearly twice the salary Johnson was making. ( Johnson was paid $10,000 a year; Flynn’s salary would be
$17,000.) [excerpt]
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Shortly after Christmas in 1942, the U.S. minister to Australia, Nelson Trusler Johnson, decided the time was right for a break from his wartime duties. Johnson 
and his wife, Jane, agreed that a seaside vacation with 
their young children was in order. The Johnson family 
duly motored to Narooma, about 150 miles southeast of 
Canberra, for what they expected to be a three-week holiday 
during the peak of the Australian summer.   They chose the 
spot for its beauty—and because the children would be able 
to swim without worrying about sharks.1 The Johnsons’ 
holiday was cut short on January 8, when wire copy began 
circulating in Australia with unexpected and unwelcome 
news. Johnson was to be replaced as minister by a political 
confidant of President Franklin D. Roosevelt—Democratic 
National Committee Chairman Edward J. Flynn of New 
York. Not only would Flynn succeed Johnson in Canberra, 
he would be given an upgraded title—Ambassador 
Plenipotentiary—and expanded duties as a “roving 
Ambassador” in the South Pacific. He would also get nearly 
twice the salary Johnson was making. (Johnson was paid 
$10,000 a year; Flynn’s salary would be $17,000.) 
Contrary to protocol, the well-known Boss of the Bronx 
announced his own appointment prior to any formal news 
release from the White House.2 Two days would pass before 
President Roosevelt’s spokesman, Stephen Early, made it 
official: Johnson, Early said, had requested recall and put 
in retirement papers; Ed Flynn was the president’s choice 
to succeed him in this important theater of the war.3 The 
fact that Johnson had not asked to be replaced and had 
not intended to retire while the war was in progress was 
known only to the minister, his wife, and a few baffled 
State Department officials. The appointment had not gone 
through the regular channels, nor had the president’s 
choice been vetted by the secretary of state.
In an instant Nelson Johnson’s life was turned upside 
down. Little did Ed Flynn know it when he made his 
announcement, but his appointment was to bring him more 
grief than glory. Moreover, the president whom he had long 
served as a trusted political adviser would be seriously 
embarrassed by the headlines generated in course of the 
confirmation process and by its unlikely outcome.
As soon as news of Flynn’s nomination reached him in 
Narooma, Nelson Johnson packed up his belongings and 
returned to Canberra to begin the process of closing out his 
affairs. He did not hide his disappointment from friends, 
nor from his associates in the diplomatic corps. As Johnson 
pointed out to a number of people, including Stanley 
Hornbeck, then assistant secretary of state for Asian affairs, 
he did not want to leave Australia while the war continued. 
He was annoyed that this was how the administration spun 
the issue. However, if retirement or reassignment was the 
president’s wish, he would return to Washington as soon as 
his successor was confirmed by the Senate.4    
 No one in the Australian government knew what 
to make of the president’s decision to replace the hard-
working and popular minister. In private, reactions to the 
Flynn appointment among Australian officials ranged from 
resignation to anger. Notes of appreciation sent to Johnson 
by leading figures in the Australian government, among 
them Prime Minister John Curtin, former Prime Minister 
William (“Billy”) Hughes, and Labor Party stalwart Arthur 
A. Calwell, made him feel he had accomplished something, 
but they also reminded him that his job was not yet fully 
done. Noting his “profound regret” that Johnson was going 
to leave Australia, Calwell observed that “in our hour of 
greatest danger from invasion you were Australia’s first 
and one of its greatest friends.” No stranger to hyperbole, 
Calwell went on to say that “but for you and General 
Macarthur [sic] we might easily today be a Japanese 
Colony—a fate too terrible almost to contemplate.”5 Prime 
Minister Curtin could barely restrain his irritation with the 
president’s decision to name a political crony in Johnson’s 
place. According to the editors of Curtin’s backroom 
briefings, Curtin’s comments to the Australian press about 
the replacement of a well-respected minister with a partisan 
wirepuller were “etched in incredulous contempt.”6 
Private expressions of support for Johnson from within 
government circles were one thing, but there would be 
no official protest from Canberra. Given the Australian 
government’s dependence on American support in its hour 
of peril, there was no choice but to accept the president’s 
decision. Curtin acknowledged this in his backroom press 
briefings.7 As an American observer, John Holland, put it, 
“Australia .  .  . dare not say anything openly for in her 
desperate military plight she can not afford to question any 
act of [the] U.S.A., no matter how unprincipled.”8 
Trained to accept things beyond his control, Johnson 
intended to maintain a dignified silence on the controversy 
swirling about him. No public protest would emanate from 
his lips. As he told his friend Hornbeck, he would be a “good 
soldier” and “let nature take its course.”9 Nature’s course, 
however, proved to be anything but smooth for Ed Flynn’s 
ambassadorial ambitions. Commentators suggested that the 
nomination would not be cut and dried, owing to question 
marks about Flynn’s qualifications for the position and 
recent charges, made by the Scripps-Howard newspapers 
that Flynn had ordered Bronx County public works crews 
to install 8,000 Belgian paving blocks in the driveway of 
his upstate New York vacation home. Seemingly a faux 
scandal that Flynn had brushed off successfully through 
two grand jury investigations, those paving blocks would 
prove to be the single most potent argument against Flynn, 
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and certainly the easiest for an interested public to grasp.10 
Why had FDR nominated Flynn in the first place? The 
question begs for an answer. Flynn’s explanation was that 
Roosevelt wanted a person who got along well with others 
to manage an important diplomatic relationship. The fact 
that Flynn was friendly to organized labor—and that his 
ethnic heritage was Irish—would presumably help him in 
the work he was going to be doing in Canberra. Moreover, 
Flynn claimed, the president told him he “needed someone 
whom he could trust implicitly for this wartime post.”11 
The official explanation for the appointment was 
terse: this was the president’s choice, Stephen Early had 
noted, and Flynn was qualified for the post. Privately, FDR 
told an old friend, the Rev. Anson Phelps Stokes, that he 
needed something other than a “very old and experienced” 
diplomat in Canberra. (Johnson was surely experienced, 
having been a member of the foreign service since 1907; but 
at age 56, he was hardly “very old.” Indeed, he was five years 
younger than the president.) “What I need [is] a practical 
politician, thoroughly familiar with and acceptable to labor 
circles and, if possible, an Irishman because of the fact that 
nearly half of Australia is Irish in descent.”12 
There may have been some truth in that, but FDR’s 
remark to Stokes seems more rationalization than rationale. 
Syndicated columnist Ernest Lindley may have come closer 
to the point when he observed that Flynn had stood by 
Roosevelt through “thick and thin” in the political wars. 
That was reason enough for his appointment, said Lindley. 
Another columnist, Gould Lincoln, offered a variation on 
this theme. He suggested that Roosevelt—ever the canny 
political operator—wanted someone he could trust to 
“keep an eye” on General Douglas MacArthur, a potential 
challenger for the presidency in 1944. David Lawrence 
of U.S. News and World Report said Roosevelt was simply 
paying off a political debt to Flynn, who had engineered 
FDR’s third-term victory in 1940 and remained a key 
political adviser. His appointment, said Lawrence, was 
“an unfortunate mistake,” given that Australia was “in the 
active theater of war” and relations with its leaders should 
not be put in the hands of “a politician.”13  
Other observers were more sardonic in their response 
to this evident political payoff. Syndicated columnist 
George Sokolsky asserted that Flynn’s incompetence at 
the Democratic National Committee was the real reason 
for FDR’s move. Scripps-Howard press syndicate chief 
Roy Howard, a burr in Flynn’s saddle for more than a 
decade, suggested that the Bronx boss’s qualifications for 
the Australian post were “about equal to my qualifications 
for being Pope or for fulfilling the functions of the Dalai 
Lama.”14
It would have been difficult to sustain the argument that 
Flynn was an incompetent politician. He had done yeoman 
work for Roosevelt for nearly two decades, most especially 
in securing the president’s third-term nomination against 
a backdrop of public ambivalence about breaking the two-
term tradition. Flynn would exert himself usefully for the 
president in 1944 and for President Harry Truman in 1948. 
But being a canny politician cut two ways. All observers 
recognized that this appointment represented first and 
foremost the payment of a political debt the president owed 
to Flynn. As matters unfolded, it became more evident that 
Roosevelt was not the engine behind the appointment; 
Flynn was. 
How can one draw that conclusion? By 1942 Flynn 
was increasingly the target of sniping from the media 
and fellow politicians, and he was tiring of the political 
game. He wanted to burnish his resume before returning 
to private law practice. Only months before the Australian 
appointment was announced Flynn had pressed Roosevelt 
for an appointment as ambassador to Mexico. That proved 
an impossible gift for Roosevelt to make. Australia seemed 
right, both to the ambitious boss and the grateful and 
increasingly weary president.15 In this instance, Roosevelt’s 
normally acute instincts proved fallible.
There may never have been a nomination that received 
worse press than Flynn’s.  Editorial writers for every New 
York newspaper, including the normally pro-Roosevelt 
New York Times, castigated the nomination of a native New 
Yorker.16 The chorus was taken up across the country, with 
even reliably Democratic newspapers expressing their 
surprise, chagrin, or anger that the nomination had been 
made. An editorial writer in the San Francisco Chronicle, for 
example, suggested that FDR had appointed Flynn as a 
way to “get rid” of him as Democratic National Committee 
chairman. The Nashville Banner wrote that the appointment 
“offends Australia. It sickens America. Why, then make 
it.”17 One writer suggested that if Flynn were “eligible” 
for the Australian post, then “why not choose boss Eddie 
Kelly of Chicago as Envoy Extraordinary to China and 
issue to Boss Frankie Hague of Jersey City Plenipotentiary 
credentials to the Court of Saint James?” The nomination 
was “revolting to all decent citizens,” Edith Harmon of 
Palo Alto, California, told the president. A disappointed 
Democrat chastised the president: “How could you do it? 
Why make it so hard for us who are doing all we can to 
back you up?” Helen Clymer wrote from New York City to 
ask, “Why victimize Australia?”18 
Private correspondence addressed to the president, 
like Harmon’s and Clymer’s, was surprisingly negative and 
often caustic, with the most prominent metaphor relating 
to the “stink” of it. The “stink” motif featured prominently 
in editorial cartoons as well.19 The upshot of the sour 
reaction to the nomination was readily apparent: the 
Flynn nomination provided an opening for Republicans—
until the 1942 elections largely helpless to block New 
Deal measures—to attack the administration. With the 
Republican contingent substantially increased in Congress 
as it commenced business in January 1943, GOP leaders 
sensed an opportunity to bloody the president’s nose. The 
Flynn nomination offered an ideal test case.
Three days after the president officially nominated 
Flynn, Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) said he would 
fight to block the nomination, which he called “an insult 
to Australia” and “the most despicable yet made by the 
President of the United States.” He promised to testify 
against Flynn at Foreign Relations Committee hearings.20 
Bridges cited four grounds for his opposition: first, that 
Flynn had represented a New Yorker who had large “Jap” 
interests in the United States before Pearl Harbor; second, 
that Flynn as chancellor of New York City had invested and 
lost more than a million dollars in public funds in a firm 
that later employed him as general counsel; third, that he 
had appointed the “noted criminal and murderer” Dutch 
Schultz as an honorary deputy sheriff of Bronx County back 
in the 1920s; and finally, that the grand jury investigation 
of the use of city-owned material to pave Flynn’s Lake 
Mahopac estate was “improperly handled.”21 As a symbol 
of the fight he planned to wage, Bridges kept on his desk a 
five-pound paving brick presented to him by a New York 
delegation as a “tombstone” for Flynn’s career in public 
life. The delegation told Bridges it hoped the brick would 
serve as a warning to Australians “to nail down all public 
property when Flynn arrives [there] .  .  . as a fugitive from 
justice.”22 
While the national media saw the Flynn story as good 
fodder, few observers anticipated that the nomination 
would do more than generate interesting headlines and 
editorial commentary. Not since 1889 had the Senate 
rejected a diplomatic appointment.23 All Flynn needed was 
a solid phalanx of Democratic support in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and then in the up-or-down Senate 
vote scheduled for the latter part of January. The Democratic 
Senate leader, Alben Barkley, said he was confident Flynn’s 
nomination would sail through after a lot of what he called 
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“political noise.”24 Democratic senators, it seems, were 
prepared to carry FDR’s water for him, meaning Flynn 
would win.25 Back in Canberra the Australian government 
anticipated Flynn’s easy confirmation, as did Nelson 
Johnson, who continued carrying out his duties, but also 
stepped up plans for his return to the United States and the 
enrollment of his children in private schools in Washington.
But the Flynn issue had legs. Although Australians 
remained anxious about a possible Japanese assault on the 
homeland, with the Japanese air attacks on Allied positions 
having for the moment ceased and the Japanese expelled 
from Guadalcanal, “there was little possibility of Australia 
being invaded, even had Japan the will to do so.”26 Hence 
the Flynn nomination fight, ballyhooed by the media, was 
not going to be crowded out by war news. 
As a witness before the Democrat-dominated Foreign 
Relations Committee, Flynn was prepared to deal with 
the charges that Bridges had already announced he would 
make. He confidently brushed them off, pointing out 
that committees had investigated his official investments 
and found no wrongdoing and that the appointment of 
the gangster Dutch Schultz was under his real name—
Arthur Flegenheimer. In addition, he asserted that the 
appointment was honorific only and was soon revoked. A 
Democratic senator, seeking to be helpful to Flynn, argued 
that the Schultz appointment was no more meaningful than 
being named a Kentucky Colonel. The fact that Schultz/
Flegenheimer would be allowed to carry a concealed 
weapon was not mentioned in any defense of Flynn’s 
unusual dispensation of honorifics.27
Addressing the much-hyped paving blocks issue, Flynn 
reminded senators that he had nothing to do with sending 
Bronx workmen to his home. He was unaware, he said, that 
work was being done until it was already completed; and 
once he learned about it, he reimbursed the city for the 
paving blocks. Flynn emphasized that two Bronx County 
grand juries had accepted his explanations.28 For his part, 
Committee Chairman Tom Connolly of Texas attacked 
Bridges for implying that Flynn was somehow disloyal. 
When Connolly said he had not “heard of any objections to 
Mr. Flynn coming from Australia,” Bridges retorted, “No, 
and you haven’t heard them shouting with glee about his 
nomination, either. The Australian people probably feel that 
they aren’t in a position to object to anything the President 
does concerning them, because American soldiers are 
defending their shores and they are getting lend-lease aid 
from us. But that does not mean that they are happy about 
having this war politician foisted on them.”29
The problem with Flynn’s explanations about the 
paving blocks was not that he was necessarily lying or even 
stretching the truth. There was no smoking gun proving 
he ordered the paving blocks installed in his vacation 
home driveway. Rather, the problem lay in the perception 
that something was fishy in the arrangement. For most 
Americans, it seemed obvious that even if Boss Ed Flynn 
didn’t order anyone to do anything for him, underlings in 
the Bronx Public Works Department did not need any explicit 
go-ahead.  They knew what Boss Flynn wanted, or they 
thought they did, and they acted accordingly; that’s the 
way the boss system worked. Flynn, in short, was damned 
regardless of what he did or did not do. It did not help, 
either, that at various points in the confirmation hearings, 
Flynn claimed to have paid different sums for the labor 
of the men who placed the blocks in his driveway—$80, 
$88, and $750—while his law partner Monroe Goldwater 
referred to a repayment of $450.30 The lack of consistency in 
this testimony hurt his case.
Worse, Senator Bridges laid a trap for him on another, 
more basic, matter: his qualifications for the Australian job. 
Bridges began by peppering Flynn with questions about 
his knowledge of Australia that the ambassador-designate 
found frustrating and at times impossible to answer. How 
many states are there in Australia? Bridges asked.  “Four 
or five,” Flynn responded. Name them, said Bridges. Flynn 
conceded he could not, adding that this was no different 
than being unable to name the counties of England. Asked 
to enumerate Australia’s current population, Flynn replied, 
“approximately 10 million, I am told; I have never counted 
them.” Bridges told him he was wrong on all counts and 
continued asking questions. Flynn was able to name the 
capital of Australia and when asked about parties, replied 
that they were “Conservative and Labor, with Labor in 
control.” Bridges was unmoved. “You do not know a great 
deal about Australia,” he told Flynn. “I know enough,” 
Flynn replied.31  
At this point Bridges, who was not a member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, but rather its guest, had tested 
the patience of several Democratic members.  “Does the 
senator want him to give the whole history of Australia?” 
asked Senator James Tunnell of Delaware. Consequently, 
Bridges began pursuing the other issues he had said he 
would raise at the hearing. He elicited no new information 
about Dutch Schultz or the state investments Flynn had 
allegedly mishandled, but the damage was already done. 
The hearings were devastating to the nomination. As 
an observer quoted in the New York Herald Tribune put it, 
anyone who followed them would not know if the United 
States was “trying to export Mr. Flynn as a diplomat or 
deport him as an undesirable.”32    
Although the Foreign Relations Committee ultimately 
advanced the nomination by a 13–10 margin, three 
Democrats had voted against Flynn in committee, and 
several others—doubtless reading their mail and the 
newspapers—began expressing doubts. Publicly, the White 
House remained committed to the nomination and Flynn 
expressed confidence he would be confirmed.  
But it was not to be. The critical wedge against the 
nomination was driven by Ed Flynn’s old political enemy, 
Ed Crump, the Democratic boss of Memphis, Tennessee. 
Crump had long nursed a grudge against Flynn on several 
counts. His preferred vice- presidential nominee in 1940, 
Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, had been nixed by 
Flynn, a supporter of the more liberal Henry A. Wallace, 
who got the nod. Further, Crump’s nominees for patronage 
positions in the Tennessee Valley Authority were usually 
ignored—a slight he blamed on Flynn, who may in fact 
have had nothing to do with the matter. Whatever the 
reality behind the Memphis boss’s grievances, Crump 
passed the word to Tennessee’s senior Democratic senator, 
Kenneth McKellar, that he wanted Flynn’s nomination to 
fail. On January 28 McKellar announced he would oppose 
the nomination. It was the tipping point in the confirmation 
battle.33 Although the Washington press suggested that 
Flynn might be confirmed with a margin of one or two 
votes, the fight had gone out of the boss.
As opposition to Flynn built, Roosevelt said not a 
word in public on behalf of his long-time associate. To an 
experienced politician like Flynn this was a sign that he 
needed to take the fall. And so he did. On February 1, Flynn 
announced that while he was confident he would have 
been confirmed in a full Senate vote, he was withdrawing 
his nomination and would seek to return to his life in 
politics. It was a stunning setback for the president. As Roy 
Howard vividly put the matter in a private letter, the Flynn 
nomination had “just exploded like a can of fermented 
tomatoes.”34 
Australians were delighted with the news, though at 
this stage they still anticipated Johnson’s departure and 
remained wary about whom FDR might nominate next. 
Some observers suggested that the former U.S. minister to 
New Zealand, Patrick Hurley—a close associate of General 
MacArthur—was lobbying for the post. No one knew 
what the president would do. Johnson, on tenterhooks, 
went about his daily business as minister. For nearly two 
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months the president kept his counsel on the subject of a 
new minister for Australia. Perhaps Roosevelt felt it would 
be unseemly to have a second name at the ready so quickly; 
perhaps he was preoccupied with more pressing matters 
on the war front. During the period of watching and 
waiting, Johnson’s friends, including Stanley Hornbeck in 
Foggy Bottom, reminded Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
that the present incumbent wanted to remain on the job 
and deserved to stay. Meanwhile, reporters—notably those 
working for Scripps-Howard papers—were pressing Hull 
on Johnson’s status. Well aware of Johnson’s attributes, Hull 
was not unsympathetic.35 In the latter part of March, Hull 
was finally able to get Roosevelt’s attention and on March 
24 received the go-ahead to inform Johnson, by telegram, 
that he could continue in Canberra.36 The news reached 
the pages of both American and Australian newspapers 
on March 25.37 “Hearty congratulations,” wrote Stanley 
Hornbeck to his old friend.  “It’s been nasty—but it ends 
well.”38 
Australians expressed themselves satisfied with the 
outcome, among them former Prime 
Minister Hughes and current Prime 
Minister Curtin. Curtin issued a 
statement: “I feel that I cannot exaggerate 
the value of Johnson’s work in Australia. 
This country is deeply indebted to him.” 
In a handwritten note the day he learned 
of FDR’s decision to keep Johnson on, 
Curtin told Johnson that it was with 
“deep pleasure” that he received the 
announcement from Washington. “You 
know that it would be presumptuous 
for me to hold opinions regarding the 
appointments your country makes. But I can express my 
delight when they keep valued friends within my small 
orbit. And if, as I hope, the delight is mutual, then heaven 
be praised.”39 The delight was mutual. In responses that 
became formulaic in the telling, Johnson assured Curtin 
and his other correspondents that he was “content” with 
the outcome and looked forward to staying on the job until 
the war was won.40 
Johnson’s friends’ reactions ranged from relieved to 
ecstatic. Former diplomat and Undersecretary of State 
W.R. Castle told Johnson that the Flynn “business” was 
“so disgusting that it really shocked the whole country, 
and it added to your popularity because, as you know, 
we Americans always like the fellow who has been 
unfairly treated.” Keeping a low profile during the Flynn 
nomination, he added, had been the right way to handle the 
matter—making it possible for FDR to ask him to revoke 
his (bogus) retirement request and to assure him that he 
wanted him to remain on the job.41 
Johnson remained in Canberra until 1945. He did 
not quite finish out the war in Australia, but by the time 
he departed, its outcome was not in doubt. He would 
subsequently serve as secretary general of the Far Eastern 
Commission, and upon concluding his labors there he 
retired from the Foreign Service. He spent his remaining 
years writing and lecturing about China and Australia, 
mentoring apprentice Foreign Service officers and enjoying 
life with his family in Washington, D.C. Johnson died of 
a heart attack in December 1954, while in the middle of 
an expansive oral history project conducted by Columbia 
University.42  
Ed Flynn took the humiliation of his failed nomination 
without public recriminations. He soon reclaimed his role 
as head of the Bronx Democratic organization, though 
he was not offered a similar opportunity to regain the 
chairmanship of the national committee of the Democratic 
Party. Flynn remained in Roosevelt’s inner circle and was 
part of the remarkable deliberation among Democratic 
bosses in the summer of 1944 that led to the replacement of 
Henry A. Wallace on Roosevelt’s ticket by Senator Harry S. 
Truman of Missouri.43 Perhaps as a way of making amends 
for the embarrassment Flynn suffered in 1943, the president 
had Flynn invited to serve as a presidential aide at the Yalta 
Conference of 1945. But in the end he was probably better 
known as a whipping boy for Republican politicians in New 
York, including two-time presidential nominee Thomas E. 
Dewey.44 By 1947 Flynn, having dictated his memoirs but 
still active in politics, was increasingly incapacitated by 
heart trouble and related ailments. He died in August 1953 
while on a visit to Ireland.45 
What were the implications of the battle that FDR lost? 
At a minimum, it was an ill-thought-out appointment that 
inflamed Roosevelt’s opponents and gave them a stick 
with which to attack the administration. It resulted in 
what Time called FDR’s “worst political defeat” since the 
Supreme Court packing debacle of 1937.46 St. Louis Post-
Dispatch editorial writer Irving Dilliard may have written 
the most perceptive account of the president’s stumble. 
How was it, Dilliard asked, that the “power and influence” 
of the Roosevelt administration could 
not get Flynn confirmed, when six 
months before, the administration had 
no difficulty getting Jersey City Boss 
Frank Hague’s man, Thomas F. Meaney, 
a lifetime appointment on the federal 
bench? The answer, he said, lay in the 
November election results. Thanks to a 
Republican resurgence in the midterm 
elections that brought nine new GOP 
senators into office, a coalition of 
Republicans and Southern Democrats 
was now able to stymie New Deal 
proposals it disliked. “The Flynn debacle,” Dilliard wrote, 
was the “number one manifestation” of the new clout of 
this coalition.  FDR’s defeat on the Flynn nomination was, 
Dilliard noted, a serious strike at New Dealers, if not the 
New Deal itself.47 
This was a sensible assessment. As historians have 
recently noted, by 1943 the New Deal was in effect blunted, 
first by the war, then by FDR’s loss of leverage in the wake of 
the 1942 elections.48 The Flynn nomination was a symptom, 
not a cause, of FDR’s declining domestic clout. That it 
caused the president only some temporary heartburn was 
small solace to Ed Flynn. That the president made this 
nomination, and lost by it, was no one’s fault but his own. 
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